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Abstract: This paper introduces a simulation model focused on smallholder practices 
and labour management that is used to assess the long-term impacts of alternative land-
uses in the Amazon region. Our objective is not to provide a tool for decision-makers but 
rather to inform the debate on rural practices and their likely consequences on forests 
resources, income generation, and land-use trajectories. We discuss the advantages 
and limitations of forest management (FM) for timber and permanent field of annual 
crops (PFAC), based on conservation agriculture, and the way in which they constitute 
management options with potential to protect forests while improving smallholders’ 
livelihoods. Our model shows that subcontracted sustainable FM for timber (logging 
operations outsourced) in legal reserves and PFAC are not miraculous solutions that 
allow smallholders to prosper while preserving their forests. However, the additional 
earnings originated from FM facilitate the family’s installation phase, which is often a 
critical period. Since income from FM can help farmers cultivate productive crops and 
pastures, it improves resilience to hazards (sickness and accident) that are frequent in 
the Amazon. In addition, since PFAC is an intensification technique, it has positive ef-
fects but only when adopted after the installation phase. In that case, it provides some 
additional profits by recovering degraded pastures. Considering a scenario with hazard 
probability and where 50% of smallholders’ lands have to be dedicated to forest protec-
tion, adopting FM and PFAC appears to be a win-win solution for smallholders.
Keywords: Brazilian Amazon, forest management, tropical timber, conservation tillage, 
agent-based model, multi-agents system
PART II – Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
With an extensive surface of 7 million km2, the Amazon plays a major role in water and 
carbon cycles, therefore deforestation occurring in 
the region may have severe impacts on these cycles 
at both regional and global scales (Davidson et al. 
2012). Smallholders are responsible for substantial 
amounts of forest clearing (20% to 30% according to 
Fearnside 2008). Colonisation of the Brazilian Ama-
zon started in the early 1970s and led to the creation 
of more than 500 000 km2 of agrarian settlements oc-
cupied by small farmers (Menton et al. 2009). Defor-
estation mainly occurred in three states: Pará, Mato 
Grosso, and Rondônia (INPE 2011). The Brazilian 
Forest Code states that 50% to 80% (according to 
local regulations) of landholdings must remain per-
manent forest reserve in which forest management 
plans can be executed only after approval by the local 
authorities. Although in practice, many landholdings 
have already been deforested beyond these limits, 
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more than 12 million ha of permanent forest reserves 
are still held by small farmers (Amaral et al. 2007).
In the eastern Amazon, where cattle breeding 
is a common farming activity, traditional extensive 
livestock systems have expanded on smallholdings, 
which has resulted in significant deforestation. This 
expansion has enabled the smallholders to maintain 
their production in a context in which productivity 
tends to decrease over time. Pasture degradation reg-
ularly occurs due to inadequate pasture management 
practices or repeated burning, which in turn affects 
ranching productivity (Vosti et al. 2002, Walker et 
al. 2002). Therefore many smallholders with farms 
originally under forest cover have rapidly become 
limited in terms of profit accumulation without 
land expansion (Pacheco 2009). Although conser-
vation agriculture techniques could be an alterna-
tive to preserve soil fertility and avoid deforestation, 
small-scale farmers usually do not have the technical 
knowledge or the financial capacity to implement 
such an alternative.
In the framework of the Forest and Agriculture 
(FloAgri) project funded by the European Union, 
such alternatives, called forest management (FM) 
for smallholders and permanent field of annual crop 
(PFAC), were tested with smallholders of the Transa-
mazon highway (Pará state) through the implementa-
tion of FM plans and conservation agriculture sys-
tems (Sist et al. 2010, Scopel et al. 2013).
In order to assess the long-term impacts of the 
adoption of these alternative land uses, we adapted 
an agent-based model (ABM), initially developed to 
explain deforestation processes and describe the ex-
pansion of pioneer fronts in the Transamazon High-
way region (Bommel et al. 2010). By adding new 
land-use activities (FM and PFAC), we discuss the 
advantages and the limitations of such alternatives 
and the way in which they can help protect forests 
while improving smallholder livelihoods.
The aim of this chapter is to test whether FM may 
be appropriate for smallholders and to identify the 
most important conditions that foster FM adoption 
in the Brazilian Amazon, our ABM helps to inform 
the debate on rural practices and their likely con-
sequences at the farm level. Unlike top-down ap-
proaches often directed to policy-makers, our model 
focuses specifically on smallholders’ decisions to 
better understand the constraints they experience in 
farming and the challenges they face in adopting 
more sustainable practices. Thus, this chapter aims 
to shed new light on how FM can contribute to the 
income of small farmers and why, in some cases, 
FM improves the resilience of these families against 
hazards such as illness or accident. By assessing the 
range of choices smallholders have and under which 
conditions they can integrate forest management, 
livestock, and agriculture, this chapter gives new 
elements to what seem to be the prerequisite condi-
tions for positive changes. These issues are currently 
important in the debate around the new reform of the 
Brazilian Forestry Code. The model helps in consid-
eration of future scenarios of FM by smallholders in 
the Amazon region, providing a different perspective 
on sustainable FM related to broader land-use deci-
sions at the farm level.
This chapter is organised in five sections, includ-
ing this introduction. The second section briefly de-
scribes the structure of the model and the dynamics 
of the entities. The third section presents some results 
of six land-use strategies in various circumstances. 
Then, before the conclusion, the fourth section dis-
cusses the relevance of such a model to point out how 
and why different contexts and policies can enhance 
or curtail the adoption of FM.
4.2 Comparing various land-
use strategies using an ABM
The ABMs facilitate the understanding of human-
environment interactions by pointing out the implica-
tions associated with various options for action. By 
designing the basic entities of a system and describ-
ing their distinctive behaviours, it is possible through 
the simulations to observe what can emerge at the 
global level of the system (bottom-up principle). 
When including the spatial dimension (with locali-
sation of agents’ activities), we obtain some dynamic 
maps. Because few ABMs have been designed for the 
Amazon region (Deadman 2005, Aguiar et al. 2012), 
this paper contributes to a better understanding of the 
underlying processes involved in land use.
4.2.1 Purpose of the model
ABM can be useful in management decisions (Bous-
quet and Le Page 2004). Yet it is important to stress 
that our ABM is not intended for optimisation of land 
uses. The purpose is not to predict the best way to 
achieve a desired situation but rather to explore the 
feasibility of various land-use strategies and their 
implications for smallholders (see Börjeson et al. 
2006). Thus, the model seeks to evaluate the strict 
compliance with environmental law and the long-
term effects of two alternative land-use activities. 
These land uses are PFAC based on conservation 
agriculture systems (no-tillage) and FM for timber 
in forest legal reserves (LRs). In our model, a log-
ging company contracted by the farmers carries out 
FM. These partnerships or subcontracts between 
farmers and logging companies are very common 
in the region although they are usually quite infor-
mal. The model outputs allow us to compare the 
85
PART II: CASE STUDIES
4 NEw oPPoRTUNITIES foR SmAll-SCAlE fARmERS of ThE AmAzoN ...4 NEw oPPoRTUNITIES foR SmAll-SCAlE fARmERS of ThE AmAzoN ...
economic performance and environmental impacts of 
smallholders’ practices. We did not use sophisticated 
agent approaches (such as BDI architecture(1)) but a 
heuristic household decision-making structure based 
on observations in the field, interviews with famers, 
and experts’ descriptions of rural practices (Moran 
1989, Veiga et al. 2003, Veiga et al. 2006).
4.2.2 The overall methodological 
approach
The main principle of our modelling approach is to 
compare various production activities starting from 
the same initial conditions. Considering that small-
scale farmers in the Amazon are mainly focused on 
livestock production, each agent adopts cattle breed-
ing as the main production strategy along with a set 
of specific additional activities.
From each initial state, identical for each agent, 
six simulations are run in parallel according to a 
supplementary specific activity that the agent has to 
perform (Table II 4.1). The first scenario (StandStrat, 
considered as the control scenario) corresponds to 
the business-as-usual breeder strategy, for which the 
agent invests mainly in livestock without preserving 
his LR. When an FM activity is included (FmStrat), 
the agent has to delimit and protect a part of the forest 
within his landholding, from which he can extract 
and sell timber according to the rules of selective log-
ging techniques. The PFAC strategy (PfacStrat) re-
quires the agent to cultivate 4 ha of PFAC (see Scopel 
et al. 2013). The Fm+Pfac strategy aggregates the 
two previous ones: the agent has to cultivate PFAC 
and to manage his forest, in addition to the basic 
breeder activities. The last two scenarios simulate a 
strict compliance to environmental law: the agents do 
not touch their LRs: the StandLR agent performs his 
breeder standard activities on his authorised surface 
while the PfacLR agent is also obliged to cultivate 4 
ha of PFAC. When a scenario is assigned to an agent, 
he is obliged to carry out the additional activities of 
this scenario, even if they are unsustainable for him. 
For example, in addition to his breeding activities, 
the agent with PfacStrat has to cultivate 4 ha of PFAC 
each year, even if he does not have enough resources 
for that. He is not allowed to change his assigned 
strategy during the runtime.
At the beginning of a simulation, the six agents 
are strictly identical, differing only in their strategy. 
Because the principle is to compare the results be-
tween the agents according to the scenarios, they 
cannot change their strategy during simulation and 
they do not interact.
4.2.3 Model description
Main principle
Many elements of the reality were not taken into ac-
count during the design process to keep the model as 
simple as possible.(2) In order to focus on the primary 
goal of the model, which is assessing land-use op-
tions, we kept only the entities and the operations 
related to the agricultural activities, thus omitting 
many other elements that are part of the daily life 
of the farmers (e.g. regular off-farm work, member 
aging, marriage, etc.). In this regard, the focus of 
our analysis is to better understand and assess the 
feasibility of each new activity with respect to the 
control scenario in terms of family labour manage-
ment, availability of land, and economic profitability. 
These three elements are schematised in the flow-
chart of Figure II 4.1.
(2) A full description of the model is available in Bommel et 
al. 2012.
Table II 4.1 Description of the six scenarios to assess the economic and ecological viability.
Initial conditions Strategy LR compliance Specific activities
◆ Same family structure
   (ex: 3 adults + 3 children)
◆ Same initial cash
◆ Same farm size
◆ Same initial land cover
◆ Same soil types
Breeder
No A: Standard activities
Yes B: A + Forest management
No C: A + Permanent crops
Yes D: B + C 
Yes E: A + LR compliance
Yes F: C + LR compliance 
(1) BDI (for belief–desire–intention) is presently a common 
architecture for cognitive agents. Based on a practical human 
reasoning developed by M.E. Bratman (1987), it provides a 
deliberative mechanism for selecting concurrent plans, then 
executing the active ones.
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According to its structure, a family is endowed 
by a given quantity of labour (i.e. a given number of 
available working days per season). As any activity 
requires time, the stock of available working days 
decreases with addition of agricultural activities. 
Thus, an agent is constrained by his labour endow-
ment. The agent is also constrained by the access 
to and disposal of financial resources. Therefore, to 
manage his farm, the agent owns two limited and 
interchangeable stocks: when he lacks labour force, 
he can hire temporary workers if he has financial 
resources, and conversely, when he needs money, he 
can sell a part of his available workforce as outside 
labourer days (without exceeding 90 days/season/
worker). Available financial resources are systemati-
cally actualised according to the financial results of 
the preceding period.
Model structure and dynamics
The main elements of the model are grouped in two 
packages. The first contains the structure of the farm 
and the dynamics of its vegetation, and the second 
package contains the family, its labour force, finan-
cial resources, and farming activities.
A family is composed of children (0 to 4) and 
workers (2 to 4) with a landholding that encompasses 
100 ha. Each plot (1 ha) is covered by forest, fal-
low, annual crops, or pasture. Annual crops (rice or 
corn) can be cultivated in a traditional way or using 
PFAC techniques. An unmaintained crop or pasture 
degrades progressively until it reaches a threshold 
where it becomes a fallow.
The technical and economic parameters (e.g. 
unitary prices and costs, labour demand by activity, 
and yield are available on the model web page, see 
footnote 2) have been set by looking at data from 
field surveys (Barbosa et al. 2008), experts’ knowl-
edge, and comparison of findings from other stud-
ies (de Reynal 1995, Vosti et al. 2002). The PFAC 
parameters have been obtained from data generated 
by the FloAgri project.
The simulations are run for 40 years. As the 
Amazon climate is clearly divided in rainy and dry 
seasons(3), the simulations are scheduled by an an-
nual time step divided in two sub-steps with distinct 
seasonal farming practices. At the end of the year, 
each agent performs an annual balance to level the 
accounts and make specific purchases.
For each season, the land cover evolves naturally 
and the agent performs his seasonal activities as a 
sequence of three phases: spends money for the se-
mester consumption; works on his land to produce 
agricultural goods; harvests and sells the produc-
tion.
Vegetation dynamics
Each hectare of land cover evolves naturally with 
age and according to the activities carried out in 
the plot (Figure II 4.2). For example, an abandoned 
crop encroaches gradually (i.e. its abandonment level 
increases with each season) until, beyond a thresh-
old, it turns fallow. After 30 years, a fallow turns 
to young forest, which requires 30 years more to 
provide harvestable trees (3 trees/ha). An unmanaged 
Figure II 4.1 Systemic diagram presenting the cash and workforce flows.
(3) In the Pará state, the rainy season usually starts in Decem-
ber and stops in June, so the farmers plant their crops by the 
end of November. The dry season is from June to November, 
when the slash-and-burn activities occur (Moraes et al. 2005).
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crop or pasture produces less than a managed one 
(15% drops per abandonment level):
actual production = 
      optimal production × neglected factor (1)
where: optimal production =
             production/ha done by the model data    and: 
neglected factor = (1 – degradation loss factor)abandon level 
= (1 – 0.15)abandon level
On any plot, the smallholder can suppress a cover and 
plant a new crop. To counteract the natural degrada-
tion of the crops, pastures, and cattle, some activi-
ties are required to maintain their productivity. The 
Figure II 4.2 shows all the vegetation types and the 
different ways (by natural transitions or by small-
holders actions) through which land cover changes 
its state.
The cattle dynamic is very similar to the vegeta-
tion dynamic: when it is adult, a cow produces a 
quantity of meat per year, depending on the pasture 
quality and on its level of maintenance (see equa-
tion 1). In actual terms, this production matches a 
gain of body weight and the birth of a calf. But the 
model aggregates this production as a quantity of 
meat harvested and sold by the farmer. If the herd is 
neglected, it produces less and less and finally dies. 
Because all the cattle production (i.e. the calves) 
is sold, the farmer has to buy new cows during the 
annual balance stage in order to increase the size 
of the herd.
Farmer activities
After consumption expenses (cost: individual con-
sumption × family size), the farmer performs his 
seasonal agricultural activities. Although breed-
ing is a preferred investment, the agent dedicates a 
part of his labour force for self-consumption (only 
when his cash is lower than twice his consumption 
expenses): he cultivates half a hectare per family 
member of annual crops that will be harvested in 
the next season.
Then, the smallholder spends time and money on 
upkeep of the pastures and cattle. With the remaining 
cash and manpower, he performs an expansion loop, 
whose actions depend on each scenario. The expan-
sion loop is constrained by forest or fallow avail-
ability, possibility to expand in case of constraint 
scenarios (FmStrat, Fm+Pfac, StandLR, PfacLR), 
and the availability of family resources.
At the end of a season, the remaining workforce 
is sold (max 90 days/worker). Here it should be noted 
that the sale of manpower might be unrealistic: in 
case of comfortable savings, smallholders would 
probably rather seek to improve their standard of 
living. Nonetheless, because we wanted to compare 
the results of each strategy on the same basis, we 
Figure II 4.2 The land cover state-transition diagram.
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removed this option and the sale of extra manpower 
was kept for all agents without taking into account 
any limit of savings.
Farmer specific activity: FM on LR (FmStrat and 
Fm+Pfac)
The FM supplementary activity requires the agent to 
protect his LR (80%). But while performing the FM 
scenario, he is authorised to extract and sell timber 
(3 trees/ha or 16 m3/ha) that is sold at BRL 54/m3, or 
USD 27/m3 (4). A company performs this activity and 
the charges are already deducted from the sale price. 
After having cut down the mature trees of one-third 
of the LR, the logged forest plot is protected dur-
ing the next 30 years, meaning that the entire LR is 
logged for three years and then no timber harvest oc-
curs during 27 years. Because farmers are authorised 
to slash and burn the forests located outside the LR to 
plant crops, timber extracted from this activity is also 
sold at 54 BRL/m3, or USD 27/m3. In contrast, agents 
who do not perform FM sell their trees as uncertified 
wood at BRL 27/m3, or USD 13.50/m3.
Farmer-specific activity: permanent field of annual 
crop (PfacStrat, Fm+Pfac and PfacLR)
The supplementary activity PFAC requires the agent 
to cultivate 4 ha of permanent crops. Normally, PFAC 
allows recovering degraded pastures by using no-
till techniques. But if there is no degraded pasture 
around the house (500 m), the agent looks for an old 
pasture still producing, close to the house.
In order to remain homogeneous with the other 
crop management, the modelled activities of PFAC 
consist in planting crops, upkeep, and harvesting. In 
reality, a farmer harvests his PFAC main crops (½ ha 
of rice and ½ ha of corn) at the end of the wet season 
and then sows a leguminous cover crop to control 
soil erosion and weeds, increase organic matter and 
water in the soil, and fix nitrogen. So, in a one-year 
cycle, both crops are produced. In the model, we 
consider one harvest per season that aggregates both 
crops (main and cover crop) into one (production: 
1425 kg/ha/season and price: BRL 0.835/kg, or USD 
0.418/kg).
To maintain the PFAC, the farmer has to buy 
fertilizer (BRL 357/ha, USD 178.50/ha), urea (BRL 
80/ha, USD 40/ha), and herbicides (BRL 310/ha, 
USD 155/ha), considering that the seeds have been 
stocked from the previous harvest. Thus, the agent 
spends an average of BRL 373.5/ha/season (USD 
186.75/ha/season) for keeping up the PFAC. To plant 
it, the agent buys limestone (BRL 420/ha, USD 210/
ha) and phosphate (BRL 400/ha, USD 200/ha), plus 
the maintenance products (1193.50/ha, USD 596.75/
ha).
The PFAC has a lifetime of four years. During 
its last season, the cover vegetation sown is pasture 
that will be productive in the next season.
In interviews, farmers involved in the project 
have recognised PFAC as greatly advantageous. They 
explained that they earn in comfort by working near 
their homes. This aspect is, however, not taken into 
account into the model.
4.2.4 Main principles of simulation
Each farmer owns a single lot of 100 ha and he is 
not allowed to move to another farm or to expand 
by buying new land. Each lot has a similar vegeta-
tion cover. The agents vary only in their specific 
activities (FM, PFAC, and/or LR compliance). For 
standard simulations(5), each family has three workers 
and three children. It starts with BRL 7200, equal 
to USD 3600, (members × initial cash/person = 6 × 
BRL 1200 (USD 600) and 468 available workdays 
(workers × work days per season = 3 × 156). In its 
standard version, the model is deterministic: no ran-
domness is involved during the simulations. Thus, 
from a given initial state, it will always produce the 
same output for each strategy(6).
Starting from the same state, the land cover at 
the end of a simulation (40 years) is quite differ-
ent depending on the performed scenario. After 12 
years (Figure II 4.3 bottom), the conventional breeder 
(StandStrat), for example, has converted all his land 
into pasture (this period is called the installation 
phase). In contrast, the agents in charge of FM as 
well as the agents who are artificially obliged to re-
spect the law, have maintained their LR (80 ha). Their 
installation phase is much shorter (five years).
By looking at the agents’ incomes, as noted previ-
ously, the output data cannot be rigorously compared 
with real incomes since the agents keep their standard 
of living, whatever their savings. What is more rel-
evant is to compare the economic results among the 
agents in order to rank the income levels according 
to the scenarios.
(4) Exchange rate is about 1 BRL (Brazilian real) = USD 0.50.
(5) The model has been implemented on Cormas, an ABM 
software dedicated to resources management (http://cormas.
cirad.fr).
(6) A stochastic version (with randomness) will be used in the 
analysis in order to test the impact of sickness probability or 
when specifying a new initial land cover (see 4.3.3 and 4.3.4).
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4.3 Scenarios results
4.3.1 The impacts of FM and PFAC  
for agents respecting their LR
Given the fact that the FmStrat, Fm+Pfac, StandLR, 
and PfacLR agents respect their LRs, the efficiencies 
are compared on the same area available for cultiva-
tion (20 ha) (Figure II 4.4). Indeed, at the end of the 
third year, each agent has deforested his authorised 
surface. The rest remains forest and only the FmStrat 
and Fm+Pfac agents can use it to harvest timber 
during the FM cycles.
The standard breeder obliged to preserve his LR 
(StandLR) without any alternative activity has an 
average income of BRL13 000/year for a six-member 
family, meaning BRL 361/month (USD 180/month) 
per worker, calculated from year 10 to 40, i.e. after 
the installation phase; this is a quarter below the 
minimum salary (the Brazilian minimum salary in 
2009 was BRL 465/month, or USD 232.50/month, 
see Portalbrasil, 2009). During the first five years, 
the family income originates mainly from production 
of annual crops and timber sales while converting 
forest into pasture. During this installation phase, the 
smallholder invests intensively in livestock by buying 
cows and planting new pastures. When the authorised 
20 ha are fully covered with pasture and because the 
smallholder cannot buy new land, he manages his 
herd and sells out the remaining available working 
days of the household. The regular fluctuations in 
livestock income are due to the sale of the cull cows 
and the purchase of heifer calves.
FM significantly increases the incomes of Fm-
Strat and Fm+Pfac agents every 30 years (the du-
ration of the forest rotation cycle). The first growth 
peak is smaller than the second one because the 
agents invest in livestock: while planting new pas-
tures and buying many cows, they transfer a high 
part of the first FM profits into livestock capital. Ac-
cumulated cash income over 40 years for these two 
scenarios is about BRL 907 000 (USD 453 500), or 
Figure II 4.3 Example of land cover for a standard simulation for two different farms after 20 years.
Figure II 4.4 Evolution of the annual incomes of four agents respecting their LRs, during a standard 
simulation of 40 years.
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55% higher than for the breeder obliged to preserve 
his LR without FM.
Between the timber harvesting periods, incomes 
for FmStrat and Fm+Pfac agents drop to a value 
close to that of the StandLR agent. Nevertheless, 
even during this forest regeneration phase, FM has 
a positive effect: mean income during the renewal 
phase is approximately BRL 1090 (USD 545)/month 
for StandLR, while it reaches BRL 1670 (USD 825)/
month for FmStrat and Fm+Pfac, which is 52% 
better. Such difference is linked with livestock and 
pasture quality: short of savings, the StandLR agent 
does not succeed in maintaining all the pastures and 
the cattle, which gradually become less productive 
(equation 1). Thus, the mean monthly income from 
livestock for the StandLR agent is BRL 344 (USD 
172) while it is more than twice as high for the Fm-
Strat agent: BRL 797 (USD 398.5). In this scenario, 
FM income provides some financial resources that 
allow the farmer to maintain the productivity of live-
stock and pasture.
The starting phase (first 10 years) for the PfacLR 
agent is as difficult as that of the StandLR agent. But, 
by adopting permanent crops, this agent succeeds 
in gradually recovering the degraded pastures and 
thus is able to reach higher cattle productivity. This 
agent also increases household income by harvest-
ing his permanent crops. As PFAC requires more 
labour for planting and maintenance, the agent sells 
fewer working days. Nevertheless, after 12 years, 
the annual income becomes higher than that of the 
StandLR agent, and it is equivalent to agents involved 
in FmStrat and Fm+Pfac after 20 years. At midterm 
(15 years), PFAC provides positive effects on family 
income.
The diagram in Figure II 4.5 shows the annual 
incomes of the agents according to family structure. 
The same former simulations have been run but here 
for a family of eight members, with successively one 
to eight workers.
Not surprisingly, whatever the agent strategy, an-
nual income increases as the family has more work-
ers. This increase is mostly due to the higher number 
of working days available to be sold. However, for 
the breeders who do not perform FM (StandLR and 
PfacLR agents), an income shift is observed when 
there are more than four workers: above this number, 
the family is able to maintain and clean up all its 
pastures, thus the difference in annual income with 
agents performing FM is low and solely due to the 
timber harvest peaks. Below four workers, the family 
lacks the labour force to maintain all its crops and 
pastures, which causes a decrease in productivity. We 
can thus conclude that, when subcontracted, FM is 
mainly useful for families with few workers since it 
helps to compensate for the lack of manpower.
4.3.2 The cost of staying legal
This section assesses the cost of staying legal by 
preserving the LRs. As stated in the Forest Code, 
the law requires landowners in the Amazon to con-
serve 50% to 80% of their farmland in forest. The 
following simulations compare agents that respect 
their LRs (FmStrat, Fm+Pfac, and StandLR agents) 
with those who do not (StandStrat and PfacStrat). 
Figure II 4.6 shows the evolution of the agents’ an-
nual income. The installation phase (time to cut the 
forest) is much longer for StandStrat and PfacStrat 
agents − 12 years − compared to the five years for 
FmStrat and Fm+Pfac agents (and also for StandLR 
and PfacLR agents). During this phase, they face 
Figure II 4.5 Annual incomes of the agents according to the number 
of workers.
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low income (short farm production and investment 
in livestock). But after this period, when they have 
completely turned their farm into pasture, StandStrat 
and PfacStrat agents succeed in increasing their sav-
ings more rapidly than the other agents who kept 
their LRs. Such a shift is linked with the livestock 
income on 100 ha instead of 20 ha and the fact that 
not much manpower is required for its maintenance 
(300 working days/year for 100 ha of pastures with 
cattle).
Once the standard breeder converts the 100 ha 
of his land to pastures, his activity consists mainly 
in managing his herd and selling the extra labour 
force. For these specific simulations, FM does not 
compensate the breeding loss due to pasture limita-
tion. Excluding the installation phase, the monthly 
income of the StandStrat agent is about BRL 4250 
(USD 2125), whereas it is only BRL 1670 (USD 835) 
for a breeder doing FM, i.e. 60% lower. Such results 
give an idea of the opportunity cost for smallholders 
to conserve the LRs even when FM is possible.
The PfacStrat agent has results similar to that of 
the StandStrat agent. Since he needs more manpower 
to plant and maintain PFAC, his income is a little 
lower than that of the StandStrat agent. Unlike the 
PfacLR agent on 20 ha (Figure II 4.4), PFAC has no 
positive effect when using the 100 ha, even after a 
long period.
The Brazilian Forestry Code allows, in certain 
zones (consolidated zones, defined by the ZEE plan: 
the state of Pará delineated its territory in Ecological-
Economic Zones), to use and deforest up to 50% of 
the farm (Figure II 4.7).
Obviously, this modification of LR does not af-
fect StandStrat and PfacStrat agents because they 
ignore these constraints. But for the agents that keep 
their LRs, this change of the LR ratio increases their 
monthly incomes: from BRL 1090 to 2500 (USD 
Figure II 4.6 Evolution of annual incomes during a standard simulation 
of 40 years, according to four agent types.
Figure II 4.7 The annual income of the agents when LR is set to 50%.
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545 to 1250) for StandLR (+130%); BRL 3035, or 
USD 1517.50 (+81%) for FmStrat; and BRL 2680, 
or USD 1340 (+74%) for Fm+Pfac. Compared to 
the StandLR agent obliged to protect his LR, the FM 
has a lower impact on income, except for the first 
years of installation.
Thus, economically speaking, a reduction of LR 
to 50% would help small farmers more than applying 
FM on 80 ha. On the other hand, if LR were complied 
with (which is seldom the case), it would decrease 
the forest size from 80% to 50%.
4.3.3 Portion of property initially 
deforested
To ensure a good understanding of the model, it is 
also necessary to begin the simulations from initial 
states with less virgin forest, as is presently the case 
for a majority of smallholders in Pará. Modifying 
the initial deforestation part, from 0% to 100%, has 
resulted in the following output. For each new ini-
tial state of the farms, deforested plots are randomly 
covered by an annual crop, pasture, or fallow, with 
a random degradation level. In the cases where the 
deforestation is greater than the authorised portion 
(20%), the agents that respect the law (FM and LR 
strategies) will not use a part of their land (covered 
by fallows and old crops) so that forests can regener-
ate. But because forest regeneration is a very slow 
process, the simulations show that full restoration of 
the LR comes after a long period (about 38 years ac-
cording to the initial degradation level). In that case, 
the agents undertaking FM can harvest timber even 
if their forests are below 80 ha (which is something 
that is not authorised in practice). For each value 
of the initial deforestation portion parameter, 100 
simulations are repeated in order to normalise the 
effect of the randomness (Figure II 4.8).
The analysis shows that the incomes of the Stand-
Strat and PfacStrat agents, who do not respect the 
LR constraints, decrease rapidly with the initial deg-
radation rate. This is because the farmer spends time 
and money to maintain degraded pastures that are 
basically unprofitable due to their poor productiv-
ity (the “initial deforested” parameter requires that 
a portion of the land cover is degraded, so equation 
(1) gives a lower production). Since the beginning 
of the settlement is very sensitive, losing time and 
money for land recuperation during the first stage 
holds back the development of the agents. When 40% 
of the farm is deforested, the standard breeder has the 
same income as the StandLR agent, i.e. he is mainly 
a farm labourer.
For the FmStrat agent, who is spending energy 
to maintain unprofitable pastures on 20 ha, the lack 
of preserved forest also reduces the FM profits and 
has a more negative effect on income compared with 
the Fm+Pfac and PfacLR scenarios.
The signatures of the agents doing PFAC (Pfac-
Strat, Fm+Pfac, PfacLR) are dissimilar: Fm+Pfac 
and PfacLR agents that work on 20 ha are not af-
fected by the initially deforested parameter. Because 
they do not spend much on livestock, they are able to 
recover their degraded pastures and manage a small 
area whatever the initial degradation level. Fm+Pfac 
provides the best income when initial deforestation is 
higher than 25%. On the opposite end, PfacStrat has 
low resistance to initial degradation, mainly for low 
deforestation rate. This is because the agent spends 
a lot of energy to plant permanent crops while in-
vesting at the same time in livestock and expanding 
Figure II 4.8 Mean annual incomes according to initial deforestation.
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in the forest. So, when starting from degraded land, 
PFCA presents positive effects but solely when the 
farmer does not invest heavily in livestock at the 
same time. Depending on the degraded surface, the 
period to get PFAC positive effects can be long. By 
comparing, for example, the dynamics of StandStrat 
and PfacStrat from a 20% degraded farm, the mean 
income of StandStrat over the 40 years’ simulation 
is higher than of PfacStrat. But PfacStrat has much 
better incomes only after a long period (20 years, 
not visible in Figure II 4.8).
4.3.4 FM, PFAC, and resilience
Analysing the effect of hazard (sickness and acci-
dent) on smallholders is important since the family 
workforce plays a key role in household strategies. 
For the previous analysis, the sickness probability 
was set to zero, but the available statistics show that, 
in Amazonian pioneer fronts, hazard is greater and 
the risk of becoming seriously ill or being injured is 
higher than elsewhere in Brazil. According to IBGE 
(2008) estimates a person stays in a hospital once 
every 10 years (5%/season/person).
For the current analysis, the sickness option has 
been activated. In the next graph, Figure II 4.9, the 
sickness probability has been tested from 0% to 12% 
per season (analysing upper probability is not useful 
since the available labour force is almost zero). For 
each season, every member of the family has a ran-
dom chance to be sick and unable to work during this 
time. Due to stochastic events, the simulations are 
repeated 100 times for each parameter new value.
Obviously, all the agents lose income to the ex-
tent that hazard risks increase. Interestingly, Stand-
Strat and PfacStrat agents who do not respect their 
LRs are more sensitive to hazard. They can hardly 
expand and maintain their pastures and cattle when 
they lose manpower. In contrast, agents managing 
their forests (FmStrat and Fm+Pfac) tend to be more 
resistant to hazards because of the extra revenues 
coming from FM that make them much less affected 
by a temporary loss of labour. As the PFAC strategy 
requires additional investments in money and man-
power, PfacStrat and PfacLR are more sensitive to 
hazards. FM compensates this sensitivity in the case 
of the Fm+Pfac agent. So, these results confirm the 
previous ones (Figure II 4.5): when subcontracted, 
FM helps to compensate for the lack of manpower.
Figure II 4.10 shows the distribution of incomes 
when hazard probability is set to its standard value 
(5%/ season/person). In addition, it compares the ef-
fect of the LR authorised level for the two scenarios 
− 80% and 50%.
The bar chart (right) presents the average income 





 agents have 
similar mean incomes (about BRL 30 000/year, or 
USD 15 000/year). But the standard deviations are 
quite different: StandStrat shows irregular incomes 
while FmStrat and Fm+Pfac are much more regular. 
This irregularity of incomes is more visible on the 
left chart: here, each point is the annual income of an 
agent for one simulation. By sorting these values for 
100 simulations, the curves show how these incomes 
are distributed. For standard breeders exploiting 100 
ha, the chances to succeed are spread from high-
est to lowest incomes (high variance): in more than 
20% of the simulations, the StandStrat agent fails 
to manage his farm. When an accident or a disease 
Figure II 4.9 Annual incomes of the agents according to sick probability 
per member; 0.05 is the standard risk from literature.
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occurs in the installation phase, the consequences 
strongly impact this agent’s economic situation and 
his farm’s productivity. This agent is more able to 
resist hazards when his expansion phase is complete. 
These results are worst for the PfacStrat agent, who 
fails in 60% of the cases: this agent is more sensitive 
to hazard during the installation phase. As PFAC 
requires investments, it is only profitable in the long 
term when the family is strongly installed.
In contrast, FmStrat and Fm+Pfac agents, who 
manage their forests, have very stable incomes. Even 
when a family member is unable to work, the qual-
ity of the farm production is such that the family 
can better resist a temporarily lower labour force. 
When the LR is set to 50 ha, the mean income is 
equal to that of StandStrat, but with low fluctuations 
(over 100 repetitions) and, above all, with 50 ha of 
preserved forest.
4.4 Discussion: Optimal 
conditions versus hazard and 
degraded lands
As stated by Popper (1963) for theories, a model 
cannot be validated in the sense of having complete 
confidence on its outputs. Like theories, a simula-
tion model is inherently wrong (Bradbury 2002): 
sometimes it can be corroborated by data but in most 
cases, it is refuted by empirical observations. So, we 
consider that comparing the model outputs with data 
does not permit a conclusion that it is undoubtedly 
valid; the data comparison is just a way to increase 
the likelihood of its results. Furthermore, since the 
alternative practices developed in the FloAgri project 
are recent and not broadly used in the Amazon, it is 
also hard to compare the model outputs with real 
data. But while the lack of historical data prevents us 
from “validating” the model, its dynamics are coher-
ent with observations and expert knowledge. Instead 
of comparing static data on each practice indepen-
dently (performing a cost/production comparison 
is quite simple), the ABM helps demonstrate how 
various activities can interact. It helps explain why, 
depending on the context, some practices can either 
be efficient or fail. Of course, it would be interesting 
to compare our results with an optimisation model 
that aims to determine the best mixture of land-use 
patterns. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that 
our ABM does not seek to optimise land-use distri-
bution. Since it focuses on the behaviour of agents 
in a temporal dimension, it helps us understand the 
reasons for success or failure of a strategy in vari-
ous situations.
Our results show that without any agricultural 
alternative, a small breeder compliant with LR has 
low income that comes mainly from the sale of his 
labour force. A change from 80% to 50% of LR 
would obviously increase his cash income (+130%) 
more than investing in FM of his LR (+52%, without 
hazard).
The model shows that FM and PFAC are not mi-
raculous solutions that allow a smallholder to prosper 
while preserving his LR. Compared to a standard 
breeder artificially restricted on 20 ha (StandLR), the 
adoption of alternative practices like FM can increase 
his income (twice his standard income in the best 
case). But what he earns from 20 ha of crops and 
pastures, plus the revenue he obtains occasionally 
from FM, remains lower than the income he gets 
from 100 ha of pasture. However, in that case, the 
conventional breeder has deforested all of his land 
and he is illegal with respect to the Forest Code. In 
recent years, the controls have become more frequent 
and the sanctions have been tightened to such an 
Figure II 4.10 Annual incomes when LR is set to 50% or 80%, with 5% risk probability; sorted distribution 
of incomes for each simulation (left chart); average incomes over 100 simulations and standard devia-
tion (right chart).
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extent that farmers can no longer break the law as 
they did before.
The additional practices, however, may have 
positive effects when various types of hazard are 
introduced in the model. For example, the standard 
breeders are more sensible to sick probability than 
the agents performing FM. As the risk of being seri-
ously sick or wounded is high in the Amazon, FM 
increases the resilience to hazards. The additional 
revenue generated by FM appears useful when the 
labour force is reduced because it helps with invest-
ments in productive livestock, which does not require 
a lot of work.
PFAC has positive effects when a reasonable part 
of the farm is degraded. By using no-till techniques, 
it allows recovering some productive pastures when 
the standard breeder can just maintain poorly prof-
itable cattle. But PFAC is a risky activity because 
no-till farming needs competences, manpower, and 
financial investment. The model shows that PFAC 
weakens farmers when they are in the installation 
phase: they cannot invest in such techniques and 
livestock at once. By gradually recovering degrad-
ed pastures, PFAC can be seen as an intensification 
practice that improves cattle productivity over the 
long term.
As a result, when starting from a degraded farm 
and when taking into account hazard probabilities, 
the FM may offer equivalent mean income to that 
of an unrestricted standard breeder, but with higher 
stability. Finally, coupling FM and PFAC seems to be 
an interesting alternative that might make the farmers 
more resistant to hazards and provide higher income, 
while at the same time preserving the major part of 
their forests.
4.5 Conclusions
By implementing agricultural activities related to 
standard or specific strategies, an ABM offers the 
advantage of explaining how several actions can 
complement or compete. In contrast, a simple com-
parison of static economic returns between different 
activities does not inform about such complementari-
ties. By targeting the model on the management of 
the labour force, the simulations allow us to explain 
how some actions may affect the achievement of 
others. Thus, our ABM helps to explain why some 
alternative practices can either be efficient or fail, 
depending on the context.
As several studies have already pointed out, suc-
ceeding in making a small-scale FM plan financially 
viable in the Amazon region remains a challenge and 
many barriers have yet to be removed (Hajjar et al. 
2011, Drigo et al. 2013). It is considered relatively 
risky in the short term to invest in FM, whereas in-
vesting in cattle is often considered to be a safety 
option, at least in the short term. The latter situation 
may reverse in the long term, but only with stronger 
efforts to decrease the many barriers threatening the 
long-term viability of FM (see Part II, chapter 3, or 
Drigo et al. 2013).
However, standard breeding, which is the most 
common production system among smallholders 
in the Amazon, is also risky during the installation 
phase (Tourrand 2009). When taking into account the 
current available cash and manpower of a family, our 
ABM shows that a breeder quickly meets difficul-
ties that prevent him from developing his operations 
as he would under optimal conditions. The model 
reveals that the agents that prefer to pursue ranch-
ing activities by converting all their land to pasture 
are economically vulnerable at the beginning and 
they can easily fail due to increasing risk and land 
degradation.
In contrast, the agents who are able to manage 
their forests tend to strengthen their resilience capaci-
ties against hazards, mainly when considering the 
sickness probability. Indeed, when subcontracted, 
the FM cannot improve the mean annual income 
of smallholders much in the Amazon, but it tends 
to stabilise the income and improves household 
resilience in the long term by helping to maintain 
good productivity from pastures and livestock on a 
reduced area.
Adding PFAC increases potential benefit for 
families to invest in FM, underlying potentially in-
teresting complementarities. When few pastures are 
degraded, PFAC improves cattle productivity over 
the long term. Nonetheless, as PFAC is an inten-
sification technique, it cannot be performed while 
investing in livestock.
Since controls and sanctions have been strength-
ened in recent years in the Brazilian Amazon, it is no 
longer viable to be illegal with respect to the Forest 
Code. But, without any agricultural alternative, a 
small breeder compliant with the Forest Code would 
have very low income, earning a living by selling his 
labour. In that situation, an investment in efficient 
FM could double the revenue. A change from 80% 
to 50% of LR would obviously increase his income. 
Thus, despite the precautions required in any mod-
elling, our results allow us to conclude that FM as-
sociated with intensification practices such as PFAC 
may allow smallholders to achieve incomes equal to 
those of extensive ranching over all landholdings. 
Furthermore this production system is less sensible 
to hazards while it preserves the forest.
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